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3 How to model marine reserves ?
Patrice Loisel ∗Pierre Cartigny †
Abstract: The safeguarding of resources is one of the principal subjects of
halieutics studies. Among the solutions proposed to avert the disappearance
of species, the setting in place of no take reserves is often mentioned. Most
work on this subject, theoretical as well as applied, was undertaken in recent
years. In this paper, we seek to compare two different models presented in
existing literature by highlighting their underlying assumptions. Both models
were derived from what is often referred to as the ”model of Schaefer-Clark”
(reference to the work of the last author on Mathematical Bioeconomics :
Clark [7]). We show that various variations of this model lead to properties
that can be very different.
Keywords: dynamical system; calculus of variation; infinite horizon; ma-
rine reserve; bioeconomic model
1 Introduction
It is now well known and largely accepted within the scientific community
that the exploitation of halieutics resources has reached a critical thresh-
old and solutions must be found urgently to conserve marine biodiversity –
and indeed the existence of certain species. Beyond the application of quota
policies, other strategies have been proposed such as the creation of marine
reserves. The study of the role of reserves in fishery management has been
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the subject of renewed interest in recent years [2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 14]. The In-
ternational Conference on the Economics of Marine Protected Areas (MPA)
held in July 2000 in Vancouver was one of the starting points in the de-
velopment of this new paradigm: the use of MPAs as an instrument in the
management of fisheries.
In economics literature, Sanchirico and Wilen [18] seem to have been the
first to suggest that MPAs could be beneficial not only from an ecological
but also from an economic point of view. In their dynamic and spatial model
of a Marine Reserve Creation, they analyze whether the transfer of biomass
from the reserve to areas where catch is allowed could create economics profit
from the MPA since its creation could help to improve a depleted biomass
and increase catch outside of the reserve. They call this a double-payoff
because in this case the MPA would increase both biomass and economic
profits from the fishery.
Both theoretical and applied aspects of the subject are well documented
in the literature. From a theoretical point of view, numerous types of models
have been proposed based on differential equations, mixing an inter temporal
dynamic that corresponds to the population growth under consideration with
a spatial distribution of this dynamic over diverse zones [9, 15, 18].
Sanchirico and Wilen construct a model where ”the population struc-
ture is characterized in a manner consistent with modern biological ideas
that stress patchiness, heterogeneity and interconnections among and be-
tween patches” [17]. In this model, independent growth dynamics thus are
associated with different patches.
Another type of model has been used in the literature to account for an
analogue structure [19] where a population develops different characteristics
in sub-zones. In these models, the population of the entire zone under con-
sideration follows a given dynamic evolution and the diverse sub-zones have
dynamics such that by aggregating them together one may rediscover the
global dynamic.
The question that one then must ask is whether these two approaches
may be used interchangeably. Few studies have focused on comparing these
different model types. We would like to demonstrate that the choice between
a patch model and a global model is not a neutral one, and highlight char-
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acteristics of these two models that often are not specified in the literature.
The two models that we will compare are both Clark type (Schaefer,
Gordon,...) [7] whose dynamic is logistic (Verhulst) and therefore widely
used in halieutics dynamics. We use them to study the consequences of
setting up a marine reserve from both an economic (inter temporal revenue)
and a biologic point of view (population stocks).
The first, the patch model, assumes a relative autonomy between reserve
and non-reserve zones. This type of model is fairly widely used. The second
model, known as the global model, assumes for its part a greater interaction
between zones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we introduce
and examine the two models we wish to study. We then compare results
obtained, particularly using numerical simulation, in Section 4. Section 5
concludes and is followed by a series of annexes that present the demonstra-
tion of various results.
2 Two variations on the Clark model
We present two modelizations for a protected area in a given zone. These two
modelizations derive from the well known fishery model studied for instance
by Clark [7] among others.
2.1 The first variation: patches model
2.1.1 The model
We consider a fish population that lives in a zone caracterised by a car-
rying capacity K = 1. We assume that this zone splits in two sub-zones,
with capacity respectively equal to α and 1 − α; we denote the stock of the
corresponding sub-populations by x1 and x2.
These two populations follow two independent evolutions laws and this
is the reason why we use the “patches-concept”. These evolutions are given
by:
dx1
dt
(t) := x˙1(t) = F1(x1(t))
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dx2
dt
(t) := x˙2(t) = F2(x2(t)).
The standard reference for the evolutions law is the logistic law:
F1(x1) := r1x1(1−
x1
α
)
F2(x2) := r2x2(1−
x2
1− α
).
But for our purpose it is enough to assume that the Fi are strictly con-
cave, C1 functions defined on [0, α] respectively on [0, 1−α] and the Fi satisfy
Fi(0) = 0, F1(α) = F2(1− α) = 0.
We now assume that some exchange exists between these two patches
and that this can be represented in terms of the density of these populations.
More precisely we assume that the existence of some diffusion between these
two patches can be captured by the following:
λ(
x2
1− α
−
x1
α
)
where λ ≥ 0 represents a diffusion coefficient ( x2
1−α
, x1
α
being the density of the
populations). The value of the diffusion coefficient depends on the location
of the protected area.
From now on, we decide that the first zone with capacity α is a protected
area where no catch is allowed, whereas in the second zone fishing is allowed.
The “normal” situation, i.e. the protected area acts like a source of biomass,
corresponds to the case where the density inside the protected area is bigger
than outside, i.e.
x2
1− α
≤
x1
α
.
The growth of the two sub-populations are governed respectively by the fol-
lowing dynamics:
x˙1(t) = F1(x1(t)) + λ(t)(
x2(t)
1−α
− x1(t)
α
)
x˙2(t) = F2(x2(t))− λ(t)(
x2(t)
1−α
− x1(t)
α
)− h(t)
(1)
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where h(t) is the capture rate at time t.
We note, from the positiveness of λ and of the functions Fi(.), that if the
sytem (1) possesses an equilibrium, it has to be necessarily normal.
As it is generally assumed the catch is proportional to the fishing effort
E, and to the density of the population [4], therefore given by:
h(t) = qE(t)
x2(t)
1− α
where q, the catchability coefficient, represents the fishing death rate when
the density of the population is equal to one. We assume
0 ≤ E(t) ≤ EM q > 0
The catch is sold on a market. In order to simplify we assume a constant
price, p, over time and a constant cost, c, proportional to the effort. Therefore
the revenue at t time is
ph(t)− cE(t) = (pq
x2(t)
1− α
− c)E(t)
We then consider the discounted total revenue on an infinite horizon is
given by
J(E(.), λ(.)) :=
∫
∞
0
e−δt(pq
x2(t)
1− α
− c)E(t) dt (2)
where δ > 0 is an actualisation factor.
We assume the existence of a manager whose goal is the maximisation
of this total revenue. Moreover we assume that this manager can act on
the fishing effort E and on some caracteristics of the reserve (closure, loca-
tion) that are captured by λ. Then the manager faces the following control
problem:
max
E(.), λ(.)
J(E(.), λ(.))
s.t. (1)
0 ≤ E(t) ≤ EM
(3)
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Remark In many papers the states variables stand for the densities of
the populations and not for the amount of the biomass. The link with the
present model is obtained in setting:
X1 =
x1
α
, X2 =
x2
1− α
The two dynamical equations that give the evolution of the populations in
the logistic case, then become:
X˙1 = r1X1(1−X1) +
λ
α
(X2 −X1)
X˙2 = r2X2(1−X2)−
λ
1−α
(X2 −X1)−QEX2
(4)
with Q = q
1−α
.
This model with patches could be considered as a more general one than the
[1] paper which corresponds to α = 1
2
.
2.1.2 Analysis of the solutions
We will study the previous optimal control problem by the help of the calculus
of variations theory .
From the dynamic (1), we deduce the expression of the effort in terms of the
state variables:
E(t) =
1− α
qx2(t)
(F1(x1(t)) + F2(x2(t))− x˙1(t)− x˙2(t))
and then we obtain the new form of the objective. Thus the optimisation
problem becomes:
max
X∈C
∫
∞
0
e−δt(p−
c(1− α)
qx2
)[F1(x1) + F2(x2)− x˙1 − x˙2] dt
C being the set of admissible curves:
C = {x(.) = (x1(.), x2(.)) xi(.) ∈ BC
1([0,∞[), xi(0) given ,
G(x1, x2)− qEM
x2
1−α
≤ x˙1 + x˙2 ≤ G(x1, x2)}
(5)
with G(x1, x2) := F1(x1) + F2(x2) and BC
1 stands for the bounded with
bounded derivative functions defined on the interval [0,∞[.
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It is known that on BC1, the first order optimality conditions given by
the Euler-Lagrange equations, apply (see [3]). We suppose that x(.) stands
for an interior solution and then x(.) has to satisfy:
lxi(x1(t), x2(t))−
d
dt
lx˙i(x1(t), x2(t)) + δlx˙i(x1(t), x2(t)) = 0
l(., .) being the non actualised Lagrangian of the calculus of variations prob-
lem, lxi(., .) stands for the derivative with respect to xi and lxi(., .) stands for
the derivative with respect to xi..
The Euler-Lagrange equations becomes then
x˙1 = x2(
pqx2
c(1−α)
− 1)(F ′2(x2)− δ) + F1(x1) + F2(x2)
x˙2 = x2(
pqx2
c(1−α)
− 1)(δ − F ′1(x1)).
(6)
We first are interested by the non trivial equilibria , (x∗1, x
∗
2), of (6) i.e. such
that Fi(x
∗
i ) 6= 0, i.e. x
∗
1 6= 0, α and x
∗
2 6= 0, 1− α. It is easy to establish that
such equilibria have to satisfy (Appendix 1)
F ′1(x
∗
1) = δ.
We now assume that r1 > δ. Then in the logistic case, from the strict con-
cavity of F1(.), we immediatly deduce the existence of a unique x
∗
1 ∈]0, α/2[.
Therefore we obtain the following result whose proof is postponed in Ap-
pendix 1.
Lemma 1 In the logistic case with r1 > δ, there is a unique positive non
trivial solution, (x∗1, x
∗
2), of the Euler-Lagrange equations (6). This solution
is caracterised by
x∗1 =
α(r1 − δ)
2r1
and x∗2 given by
x2[
2r2pq
c(1− α)2
x22 − (
pq
c(1− α)
(r2 − δ) +
r2
1− α
)x2 − δ] = α
(r1 − δ)(r1 + δ)
4r1
. (7)
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Clearly x∗1 ∈]0, α[. It remains to show that x
∗
2 ∈ [0, 1 − α]. This can
be done straightforwordly but we prefer to use the following approach. We
recall that if (1) possesses a non-zero equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) then it is necessarily
normal that is to say
x∗
2
1−α
≤
x∗
1
α
and we first observe that if this last condition
holds then x∗2 ≤
x∗
1
α
(1− α) ≤ 1− α.
We prove now that this condition holds under conditions on the ratio pq
c
and
on the size of the different zones given by α.
Let us introduce T (.) defined from the left hand member in (7)
T (z) = z[2r2θz
2 − (θ(r2 − δ) + r2)z − δ]
where θ := pq
c
. Then:
T (
x∗2
1− α
) =
α
1− α
(r1 − δ)(r1 + δ)
4r1
.
As we assume r1 > δ, then T (
x∗
2
1−α
) > 0. From the graph of T (.) we deduce
that the inequality
x∗2
1− α
≤
x∗1
α
holds if and only if
T (
x∗2
1− α
) ≤ T (
x∗1
α
).
Let us introduce when r1 6= r2
θ0 := (
2r1
r1 − δ
+
r2
δ
)
r1
r1 − r2
. (8)
The following result is detailled in Appendix 2.
Lemma 2
In the logistic case,
1. if r1 > r2, for each θ > θ0 if α satisfies
α(r1 + δ +
r1 − δ
r1
(θδ
r1 − r2
r1
− r2)− 2δ) ≤
r1 − δ
r1
(θδ
r1 − r2
r1
− r2)− 2δ (9)
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then the solution (x∗1, x
∗
2), of the Euler Lagrange equation (6) given in
Lemma 1, is normal i.e. satisfies:
x∗2
1− α
≤
x∗1
α
2. if r1 ≤ r2, (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is never normal i.e.
x∗2
1− α
>
x∗1
α
.
Then it remains to prove that (x∗1, x
∗
2) is a candidate to the optimisation
problem (3), thus that the constraints are satisfied.
If the conditions in the Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.1 hold, then F1(x
∗
1) >
0 and
x∗2
1− α
<
x∗1
α∗
. Therefore to this corresponds a unique coefficient of
diffusion λ∗ > 0.
From (1) we deduce that
E∗ =
1− α
qx∗2
(F1(x
∗
1) + F2(x
∗
2)) > 0. (10)
Moreover the expression of the total revenue is given by
J∗ = (pq
x∗2
1− α
− c)
E∗
δ
. (11)
This revenue is positive if the fishery profit is positive at this equilibrium,
that is to say if
x∗2
1− α
>
c
pq
=
1
θ
.
But this inequality holds because we have
T (
x∗2
1− α
) > T (
1
θ
) = (1− θ)
r2
θ2
and due to the fact that θ ≥ θ0 > 1, this last term is nonpositive .
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Proposition 1
In the logistic case if r1 > δ the problem (3) possesses at most a non trivial
and positive optimal stationary solution caracterised by
x∗1 =
α(r1 − δ)
2r1
and x∗2 given by (7). The corresponding effort, diffusion coefficient and total
revenue are given respectively by (10), (1), (11).
Remarks
1) When α = 1
2
the value of θ0 coincides with the value p˜m given in [1].
2) From the expression of θ0 in (8), we observe that r1 can’t be closed to r2.
If this is not the case, then the value of the dimensionless ratio θ has to be
very high. But this can be unrealistic because the value of θ is given by the
economic environment.
3) From (8 ) with a given value for θ we can precise a bound for r2 expressed
in terms of r1, δ:
r2 ≤
θ − 2r1
r1−δ
θ + r1
δ
r1.
2.2 The second variation: the splitting of a unique
zone
In this second model we start with an unique zone with capacity K that
we normalise to one, K = 1. Let us assume that the population follows a
standard evolution law:
z˙(t) = φ(z(t)) (for instance = rz(t)(1 − z))
φ(.) being a C1 concave function defined on [0, 1], with φ(0) = φ(1) = 0 and
φ′(1) < 0. We assume that this zone splits first in a part that is a reserved
area where no fishing is allowed and a complementary part that is open to
harvest. We assume that these two parts have respectively α and 1− α as a
carying capacity.
The main difference with the previous model is that the two populations,
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which stocks are respectively x1 and x2 follow the evolution laws given by:
x˙1(t) = F (x1(t), x1(t) + x2(t))
x˙2(t) = F (x2(t), x1(t) + x2(t))
where F (., .) satisfies the standard assumption of regularity with F (x, z) =
0 if and only if x = 0 or z = 1 and where F (.) and φ(.) satisfy
F (x1, x1 + x2) + F (x2, x1 + x2) = φ(x1 + x2).
For instance F can be a logistic function
F (x, z) = rx(1− z) = rx(1− (x1 + x2)).
As in the previous model, there is some diffusion between the two zones which
can be represented by:
λ(
x2
1− α
−
x1
α
).
Then the two populations evolve following the dynamics:
x˙1(t) = F (x1(t), x1(t) + x2(t)) + λ(
x2(t)
1− α
−
x1(t)
α
)
x˙2(t) = F (x2(t), x1(t) + x2(t))− λ(
x2(t)
1− α
−
x1(t)
α
).
We want to stress on the fact that this new model is consistant in the sense
that the sum of the two dynamics is exactly the evolution law of the total
population.
Now taking into account the catch in the zone where fishing is allowed,
we derive the final dynamics of the populations
x˙1(t) = F (x1(t), x1(t) + x2(t)) + λ(
x2(t)
1−α
− x1(t)
α
)
x˙2(t) = F (x2(t), x1(t) + x2(t))− λ(
x2(t)
1−α
− x1(t)
α
)− qE x2(t)
1−α
(12)
where E ∈ [0, EM ] stands for the fishing effort and q > 0 is the catchability
coefficient.
In order to compare with the previous model, we assume that a manager
has as an objective to maximise the actualised total revenue as presented
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before. To do so, he has to act on two controls, the fishing effort and the
location of the reserve area given by λ. Therefore the manager faces the
following program of optimisation
max
E(.), λ(.)
∫
∞
0
e−δt(pq x2(t)
1−α
− c)E(t) dt
s.c. (12)
0 ≤ E(t) ≤ EM
(13)
2.2.1 Analysis of the solutions
From the dynamic equations (12) we can derive the expression of the effort
E(t) =
1− α
qx2(t)
(φ(x1(t) + x2(t))− x˙1(t)− x˙2(t)) (14)
and then we obtain the equivalent problem to (13) as a calculus of variations
problem:
max
X∈C
∫
∞
0
e−δt(p−
c(1− α)
qx2
)[φ(x1 + x2)− x˙1 − x˙2] dt
where C stands for the set of feasible curves defined by:
C = {x(.) = (x1(.), x2(.)) xi(.) ∈ BC
1([0,∞[), xi(0) given ,
φ(x1 + x2)− qEM
x2
1−α
≤ x˙1 + x˙2 ≤ φ(x1 + x2)}.
We know that in this framework a necessary optimality condition for an
interior solution x(.) is given by the Euler-Lagrange equations that are:
x˙1 = x2(
pqx2
c(1−α)
− 1)(φ′(x1 + x2)− δ) + φ(x1 + x2)
x˙2 = x2(
pqx2
c(1−α)
− 1)(δ − φ′(x1 + x2)).
For now, we will stick to the logistic case. The Euler-Lagrange equations are
then:
x˙1 = x2(
pqx2
c(1−α)
− 1)(r − 2r(x1 + x2)− δ) + r(x1 + x2)(1− (x1 + x2))
x˙2 = x2(
pqx2
c(1−α)
− 1)(δ − r + 2r(x1 + x2)).
(15)
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In order to derive the non trivial positive equilibria, denoted by (x∗1, x
∗
2),
we first consider the second equation in (15) with the condition
x∗1 + x
∗
2 =
r − δ
2r
.
This implies as a result
0 = r(x∗1 + x
∗
2)(1− (x
∗
1 + x
∗
2)) =
(r − δ)(r + δ)
4r
.
A contradiction if r > δ. In the case where r = δ, then we obtain the trivial
solution x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 0.
Then we deduce that an equilibrium has to necessarily satisfy
x∗2 =
c(1− α)
pq
.
With the help of first equation in (15) we find that either x∗1 + x
∗
2 = 0 or
x∗1 + x
∗
2 = 1.
Finding a non trivial equilibrium implies to exclude the first condition. There-
fore we have proved the following result
Lemma 3 In the logistic case there is a unique non trivial and positive
solution for the Euler-Lagrange solutions (15) given by:
(x∗1, x
∗
2) = (1−
c(1− α)
pq
,
c(1− α)
pq
).
In order to examine whether this candidate solution of the problem (13)
can be optimal or not, we have to derive the corresponding effort and diffusion
coefficient. From the expression of the effort (14), we obtain φ(x∗1 + x
∗
2) =
φ(1) = 0 that is to say
E∗ = 0.
We also deduce that
λ∗ = 0
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except if θ = 1. Finally at this equilibrium the intertemporal revenue is null
too. We have established the following proposition
Proposition 2
In the logistic case the problem (13) possesses at most a non trivial and
positive stationary solution given by
(x∗1, x
∗
2) = (1−
c(1− α)
pq
,
c(1− α)
pq
).
The corresponding effort, diffusion coefficient and total revenue are null.
Remarks
1) It is easy to obtain that this equilibrium is normal, i.e.
x∗1
α
>
x∗2
1− α
if the fishery is profitable, that is to say if
pq − c > 0.
2) An adaptation of the model given in Gomez et al. [6] to our case of a
no take zone is:
x˙1 = αr(x1 + x2)(1− (x1 + x2)) + λ(
x2
1−α
− x1
α
)
x˙2 = (1− α)r(x1 + x2)(1− (x1 + x2))− λ(
x2
1−α
− x1
α
)− q2E2
x2
1−α
.
(16)
We can get the same results as those given earlier. In Gomez et al. [6], fishing
is allowed in the so called artisanal zone (corresponding to the protected area
in our case) and the objective to be maximised is somewhat different (it takes
into account the revenues of the artisanal and industrial fisheries). Here also
it has been proved that a unique solution exists but with a non null effort
and a non null revenue.
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3 Comparison, Numerical application
In this section we underline the differences between the results we obtained
in the previous sections for both the patches case and the global model.
From their expressions given in the Propositions 1 and Proposition 2, we can
make the following remarks for the equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2):
• In the model with patches the first component x∗1 doesn’t depend ex-
plicitely on the ratio c
pq
, whereas it does in the global model.
• In the global model the second component is given by x∗2 =
c(1−α)
pq
,
whilst the patches model doesn’t possess any equilibrium with such a
component as the second, cf. Appendix 1.
Thus the expressions of the equilibria are different in the two models.
Now we established that the optimal effort and the corresponding total
revenu at (x∗1, x
∗
2) was null for the global model. This doesn’t seem to be the
case for the patches model, we will later show with simulations that optimal
effort and total revenue are not significantly close to zero.
In order to continue the comparison, let’s arbitrarily fix the parameters
p, q, c, α, δ. Thus the models depend only on the instantaneous growth rates
r1, r2 and r respectively.
If we let r1 = r2 = r, in Lemma 2 we established that the equilibrium (x
∗
1, x
∗
2)
was never normal in the patches case, while it is always normal for the global
model (Remark 1 in section 3.2).
Now to compare our models with r1 and r2 only near r, we noted in the
Remark 2 of section 3.1 that this situation wasn’t a realistic one.
Then comparing these two models is not an easy task. Our first conclusion
is: the role of the instantaneous growth rates of the biomasses are crucial to
choose such or such model. An assumption that is not underlined in general.
Now let’s come back to the comparison of the optimal efforts and revenues
by using simulations. The main issue is to determine significant growth rates
that are not equal.
But this choice shouldn’t depend on our particular models with preserving
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areas. It should be the same for a wide class of models. For instance for
models that correspond to a situation where fishing is allowed in the the two
areas ([13]). We consider thus:
x˙1 = F1(x1) + λ(
x2
1−α
− x1
α
)− qEx1
x˙2 = F2(x2)− λ(
x2
1−α
− x1
α
)− qEx2
(17)
and
x˙1 = F (x1, x1 + x2) + λ(
x2
1−α
− x1
α
)− qEx1
x˙2 = F (x2, x1 + x2)− λ(
x2
1−α
− x1
α
)− qEx2
(18)
with the same assumptions as before. In order to compare numerically (17)
and (18) we will face the same issue to determine significant growth rates.
We propose to use this new situation in order to fix values for r1, r2, r. The
new problem we consider now is to maximize the same objective as before
J(E) =
∫
∞
0
(pq(x1 + x2)− c)Ee
−δtdt
but with (17) and (18). We observe that (18) corresponds to the classic
Clark model, it is enough to let z = x1 + x2 to obtain that the dynamic is
z˙ = φ(z)− qEz.
We can assume that a manager has no reason to use one model rather
than another. Then the two models can be considered as equivalent in the
sense that they provide the same optimal effort.
Hence, we propose the following procedure to determine a system of growth
rates: Let’s set an arbitrary choice of values for r1 and r2. From the first
order optimality conditions, given here by the Pontryagin principle, we can
derive the optimal value of the corresponding effort for problem (17). We
hand-over this value in the first order optimality conditions of the second
problem (18) from which we derive the value of the growth rate r.
To follow this procedure we set:
α = .5, δ = .05, c = .15, q = 2., λ = 20
and we obtained for
r1 = 0.4, r2 = 0.05
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that
E¯ = .0566 and r = 0.28739.
Let’s now go back to our models with protected areas from where we take
the previous values for the parameters and where we set r1 = .4, r2 = .05
and r = 0.28739 .
Then for the model with patches we found that:
• the optimal effort is E∗ = .0457, and the biomass values are respectively
x∗1 = .21875, x
∗
2 = .0302
and for the global model
• E∗ = 0 et x∗1 = .875, x
∗
2 = .125 .
We observe that the optimal efforts corresponding to the patches case,
E∗ = .0457, and the Clark model (18), E¯ = 0.0566, have similar sizes. We
know that the optimal value of the effort in this last model can’t be considered
as null. Therefore we can deduce that in the first model with patches the
effort is not null.
Then the two models have different qualitative behaviour:total revenues and
optimal effort are totally different.
4 Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that different models have been proposed
and used in the literature for the same MPA problematic. We focused on
demonstrating the importance of the hypotheses underlying two types of
models – the patch model and sub-zone model –particularly the crucial role
played by the growth functions (rate and form), and on studying the different
results produced by them.
A manager who wishes to study the role of an MPA in a given zone
must first know if the entire zone is artificially divided or if it can be broken
down into patches (entities with their own dynamics). Without taking this
precaution, and in obtaining the very different results that we have seen, the
manager risks taking erroneous decisions.
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The two preceding models of resource dynamics are adapted to the case
where control instruments are independent of the size of the no take reserve.
If the manager must take size into account in his decisions, the modelling
of the dynamic has to be changed. For instance, it is necessary to consider
a depending of α diffusion coefficient. A justification is given in Appendix
3. In this Appendix, we also underline that this coefficient can be given by
formula
λ(α) = λ0α(1− α)
which is the expression considered by Boncoeur (cf. [4]).
5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix 1
We determine the non trivial equilibria of the Euler-Lagrange equations (6)
x˙1 = x2(
pqx2
c(1−α)
− 1)(F ′2(x2)− δ) + F1(x1) + F2(x2)
x˙2 = x2(
pqx2
c(1−α)
− 1)(δ − F ′1(x1)).
If we assume that x∗2 =
c(1−α)
pq
, from the first equation:
F1(x1) + F2(x
∗
2) = 0. (19)
From the assumption of the non triviality of the equilibria, we have that
c 6= 0, α 6= 1, c 6= pq and then F2(x
∗
2) > 0. Therefore we can’t find any
x1 ∈ [0, α] such that (19) holds. Thus there is no non trivial equilibrium
with x∗2 =
c(1−α)
pq
.
Therefore in order for a non trivial equilibrium to exist it is necessary
that
F ′1(x
∗
1)) = δ.
In the logistic case it is easy to compute that
x∗1 =
α(r1 − δ)
2r1
.
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Reporting this value in (6) we get the following equation for x∗2
x2(
pqx2
c(1− α)
− 1)(F ′2(x2)− δ) + F2(x2) = −F1(x
∗
1)
which is (7) in the logistic case
x2[
2r2pq
c(1− α)2
x22 − (
pq
c(1− α)
(r2 − δ) +
r2
1− α
)x2 − δ] = α
(r1 − δ)(r1 + δ)
4r1
.
The graphes of the functions defined by the left and right hand members
are curves that crosse in a single x∗2 if r1 ≥ δ. But this last inequality holds
because from our assumption we have
F1(x
∗
1) = α
(r1 − δ)(r1 + δ)
4r1
≥ 0.
This ends the proof of Lemma 1.
5.2 Appendix 2
In order to find conditions for the inequality
x∗
2
1−α
≤
x∗
1
α
to be true, we know
that it is equivalent to consider the inequality T (
x∗
2
1−α
) ≤ T (
x∗
1
α
). This last
inequality becomes
α
1−α
(r1−δ)(r1+δ)
4r1
≤
T (
x∗
1
α
) = r1−δ
2r1
[2r2pq
c
( r1−δ
2r1
)2 − (pq
c
(r2 − δ) + r2)
r1−δ
2r1
− δ]
that is equivalent to
α(r1 + δ) ≤ (1− α)(
r1 − δ
r1
(θδ
r1 − r2
r1
− r2)− 2δ).
1) If r1 > r2 the right hand member has to be positive, this implies the
following condition on θ:
θ > θ0 := (
2r1
r1 − δ
+
r2
δ
)
r1
r1 − r2
.
Now if this condition on θ holds, from the previous inequality we should
deduce (9).
2) If r1 ≤ r2, the right hand member is always negative and therefore
(x∗1, x
∗
2) can’t be normal.
This ends the proof of Lemma 2.
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5.3 Appendix 3
We consider the case where the manager has the size of the preserved area
as control. We will first prove that the diffusion coefficient has to depend on
this size.
We start with the dynamics and the objective given in the second variation
(§ 3.2). We suppose that the manager has to maximise his objective by using
the fishing effort E and the size of the preserved area that is captured by α.
We always denote by z the stock of the total population and the two sub-
populations stocks by x1 and x2 respectively. Then the densities in the two
regions are d1 =
x1
α
and d2 =
x2
1−α
.
When α = 0 we can only find a single zone and thus x1 = 0 and x2 = z. In
this case, it is natural to set for the densities: d1 = 0 and d2 = z respectively.
Now if α = 1, it is natural to set: d1 = z d2 = 0.
As we have done before, we assume that some diffusion exists between the
two zones and that it is proportional to the difference of the two densities.
Therefore in order to respect our previous remark, we have to set
λ(α)(
x2
1− α
−
x1
α
) (20)
where the diffusion coefficient depends on α. Indeed if α = 0, from d1 = 0
we deduce that λ(0) x2
1−α
= λ(0)z = 0 because in this case we can only find a
single zone, and thus λ(0) = 0. From a similar argument, we deduce that for
α = 1, we have λ(1) = 0. Now for α ∈]0, 1[ the coefficient λ(α) is certainly
not null.
For instance we can let
λ(α) = λ0α(1− α) (21)
and in this case the diffusion is modelised by
λ0α(1− α)(
x2
1− α
−
x1
α
). (22)
This expression is the one proposed by Boncoeur in [4].
Then the problem of the manager becomes in this setting
max
E(.), α
∫
∞
0
e−δt(pq x2(t)
1−α
− c)E(t) dt
s.c. (12)
(23)
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where the diffusion coefficient in (12) is given by (21).
The solution of this problem is straightforward using the Pontryagin maxi-
mum principle. We won’t mention it in this paper.
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